Polemic
Exploitation, broadly, is the act of Person A taking unfair advantage of Person B – usually made possible from B’s vulnerability (2022:1). Whilst cases of non-consensual and/or disadvantaging exploitation seem uncontroversially wrong, cases of mutually-beneficial exploitation (MBE) are harder to evaluate. Traditionally, theorists have held the requirement of
The question of which states should bear the burdens of tackling climate change, and by how much, is hotly contested. The Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP) proposes that costs be shared among states who benefit from the activities that cause climate change. By contrast, the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) proposes an
Polemic
Moral responsibility deals with how one can be held culpable for their actions. The question of whether acting on false moral beliefs can diminish one’s moral responsibility was considered by Gideon Rosen (2004), who argued for complete exculpation whenever one is unaware of their error. Using the case of
Polemic
Virtue ethics is a moral theory which, unlike its deontological and consequentialist counterparts, places virtue at its centre. Virtues, as Rosalind Hursthouse and Glen Pettigrove (2023) explain, are an “excellent trait of character” – such as honesty or altruism (2023:1). Whilst any moral theory can make space for virtues, consequences,
Polemic
The question of the moral, procreative duties of parents is an issue hotly debated in bioethics. Whilst traditional accounts have defended the importance of minimising incidence of disease or developmental conditions in foetuses, I argue that these fail to justify their means sufficiently. Further, it appears that the duty of
Polemic
Microaggressions – as first coined by Pierce (1974) – explain subtle but commonplace ‘put-downs’, targeted based on someone’s real (or perceived) membership of a social group. These acts remain distinct from overt discrimination, by the fact that the perpetrator need not intentionally cause offense. McTernan (2018) argues that these microaggressions are
Polemic
The issue of what our obligations are, and where they come from, regarding future people, is hotly debated. Theorists such as Parfit (1987) and De George (1981) have posited an inevitably limited set of moral obligations towards unborn, future people, on account of the ‘Non-Identity Problem’ (NIP). By contrast, Shiffrin
Polemic
The Paradox of Supererogation is a paradox of kindness: if we have the most reason to do the most moral things, then how can we ever do more than we are required to? That is, are we really obligated to do the most good in our actions - and if not, why?
Polemic
The epistemology of morality is a philosophical field in its own right. Nestled at its core is the question of where our sense of right and wrong originates. Specifically, can we definitively rule out evolution as the basis of our moral beliefs?
Polemic
The commodification argument is a compelling case against the sale of human body parts. But does it fall short of establishing necessary immorality, and what explains our intuitive distaste for this practice?
Polemic
In The Atrocity Paradigm, Claudia Card (2002) presents a theory of evil which breaks from previous accounts, by reframing the debate on victims of evil. For Card, evil involves culpable wrongdoing, intolerable harm, and reasonable foreseeability.
Polemic
Hannah Arendt’s ‘banality of evil’, written after the trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961, describes how ordinary people can thoughtlessly engage in acts of evil. Whilst Arendt’s original account falters, when incorporating intention, the core account of evil is defensible.