Bitesize: What explains our obligation to future people?
The issue of what our obligations are, and where they come from, regarding future people, is hotly debated. Theorists such as Parfit (1987) and De George (1981) have posited an inevitably limited set of moral obligations towards unborn, future people, on account of the ‘Non-Identity Problem’ (NIP). By contrast, Shiffrin (1999) and Velleman (2008) propose a more demanding normative theory, which asserts obligations towards future people. Crucially, this difference lies in the competing theories of harm and wrongdoing – either comparative or non-comparative. Using Kavka’s (1982) ‘slave child’ thought experiment, I argue that whilst non-comparative theories fail to best explain our obligations to future people in terms of harm, they succeed when considering only wrongdoing.
Note, for a concise analysis, only deontologically-grounded normative theories are discussed here; any discussion of impersonal, utilitarian theories lie outside the scope of this investigation. In this way, we start with a discussion of the NIP in the context of Kavka’s case, followed by the non-comparative case for obligations to future people (both in terms of harm and wrongdoing).
First, then, Parfit explains the central issue for normative theories regarding obligations to future people. Given a choice between an act which either harms present people now, or harms future people later, Parfit asks us how we can suggest that future people are indeed harmed, since they are different people to the ones that would have been produced in either act. In another way, Parfit argues that – given the incredibly contingent and multivariate environmental and biological effects which contribute to the specific form a child is created – how can any of us truly claim that “even if railways…had never been invented, [we] would still have been born” (1987:361). Indeed, this argument is difficult to overcome; it appears undeniable that each of our identities could only ever have been how they are, and thus, if we were even simply born at a different time, we would be a completely different person. Parfit extends this problem out into a normative theory, which – although hesitant to adopt it himself – implies that there are practically no obligations to future persons. This is because future persons are not harmed by present acts – they are “distinct…altogether” (1987:355).
The intuition behind this normative theory is further demonstrated when considering Kavka’s famous case of the ‘slave child’. Here, in exchange for $50,000, a couple chooses to conceive a child, to be transferred as a slave for their whole life. Whilst initially seeming outrageous, it again appears difficult to explain our sense of harm, when in fact, there is no alternative state that this particular child can be compared to. Thus, the slave child is not harmed – they are not made worse off – since this existence is their only option.
On the other hand, non-comparative theorists like Shiffrin (1999) contest this conclusion. Whilst it is true that we cannot easily explain our obligations to the child to not birth them into slavery in terms of harm practically endured, we can use some independent standard to generate our baseline. By this account, we utilise our moral standards of what harm ought not befall a child – such as quality of life – to suggest that the slave child is made worse off than they should have been. This argument seems more intuitive; we can clearly see that even if the slave child’s harm suffered is better than non-existence, we should surely apply the same minimum standards of wellbeing that are afforded to present people. Indeed, it appears strange to argue that a present people have no obligation to free any future person who of any degree of material harm.
However, comparative theorists may reasonably counter that future persons – being, by definition, future – do not deserve the same moral consideration as present people. For example, De George (1981) argues that since future people do not exist – and they cannot be actually harmed – they cannot be made worse off and should not therefore be afforded any rights. Thus, present people hold no obligations towards future people. In a similar vein, Caney (2006) argues that being brought into existence – even a slave existence – is intuitively better than non-existence; if ‘Jack’ is saved from drowning, but loses function of his legs, it would be highly dubious to suggest that he has been ‘harmed’ by his saviour. Yet, in the case of the slave child, non-comparative theorists argue that the child is made worse off than ideal, not better off than non-existence. These arguments are highly compelling; given the non-existence of future people, obligations based on harm indeed appear an untenable route for non-comparative theorists.
Whilst obligation from harm is indeed unconvincing, Velleman (2008) proposes obligations to future people based on wrongdoing. By this account, Velleman side-steps the issue of non-existence, by positing his claims solidly at the point at which future persons become present persons. Just as present people have a right to not be enslaved, so too do future persons – when becoming present persons – have a right not to be brought into a ‘flawed existence’ (here, slavery). Again, an appeal is made to our moral standards; a “child has a right to be born into good enough circumstances” and being born into slavery “isn’t good enough” (2008:277).
Parfit may reasonably counter by explaining that the slave child’s right may implicitly be ‘waived’ by their interests in being born, over not being born. However, Velleman resists this argument, arguing that just because a child was glad to be born, it doesn’t mean they have waived their ‘birthright’. This argument is convincing – just because one can overall benefit from an event, that clearly does not preclude the existence of harms that come along with it.
In conclusion, Velleman effectively establishes the basis of our obligations towards future people, by basing future persons’ rights in terms of present peoples’ moral rights. Accounts of harm from an independent standard, such as from Shiffrin, indeed fail to convincingly counter the non-existence arguments from De George and others; yet rights-based accounts nevertheless side-step this argument by grounding obligations in terms of the future rights violations occurring at the point where future people become present people. Thus, in Kavka’s example, our obligations to the future child are best explained by the duties to protect the rights that will be afforded to them, once they are born. Much like a parent is obligated to buy groceries each week – to prevent the future violation of their child’s right to nutritious food – so too does Velleman’s normative account best explain our obligations to future people.
