Does acting on false moral beliefs diminish moral responsibility?

Moral responsibility deals with how one can be held culpable for their actions. The question of whether acting on false moral beliefs can diminish one’s moral responsibility was considered by Gideon Rosen (2004), who argued for complete exculpation whenever one is unaware of their error. Using the case of the 2017 Parsons Green bombing, however, I argue that an alternative theory of moral responsibility is needed to adequately explain our moral intuitions. Specifically, I argue that moral responsibility is not diminished, since those who hold false moral beliefs necessarily and knowingly violate their procedural epistemic obligations (PEOs), establishing aware wrongdoing which guarantees derivative responsibility for the act.

Note, although thinkers, such as Elizabeth Harman (2011), have proposed theories of moral responsibility that do not require awareness of wrongdoing, these are not discussed; that is, in providing a compelling alternative to Rosen without conceding his awareness requirement, such theories are not needed.

Rosen’s theory of derivative responsibility is first explored, and its application to the Parsons Green case study. Next, the issues of whether the bomber could have held alternative moral beliefs, whether holding such beliefs was a violation of his PEOs, and whether he was aware of his PEOs, are considered. Finally, my alternative theory – which more satisfyingly answers the three core questions – is presented, in an account of so-called ‘indirect akrasia’.

First, Rosen argues that acting on false moral beliefs eliminates moral responsibility, if one was unaware that these beliefs were false. Actions can be either ‘originally’ or ‘derivatively’ responsible; original responsibility applies to acts which are intrinsically blameworthy, whereas derivative responsibility applies only wherein one’s blame originates from “some prior act or omission” (2004:299). For instance, in Rosen’s blood transfusion example, the surgeon is originally responsible if she acted despite knowing the inevitable outcome – a case of aware wrongdoing, or ‘akrasia’. However, if she acted on a mistaken belief about the blood type of the patient, then the blameworthiness of the surgeon’s act depends on the blameworthiness of the belief on which it was based. If, for instance, the surgeon chose not to double-check – or simply forgot to, from carelessness – then her act would clearly be blameworthy. Crucially, Rosen argues that “derivative responsibility presupposes original responsibility”, such that there must always be some originally responsible prior act in the ‘casual chain’ to establish blameworthiness (2004:299).

This argument is intuitively compelling; clearly, we want to hold people accountable for wrongdoing, yet exculpate them when they act with good intent, for justifiable reasons. Just as with false non-moral beliefs, if one took all necessary precautions in their beliefs, but still committed wrongdoing, we would indeed side with Rosen in excluding blame for both holding her false moral beliefs and acting upon them.

Further, Rosen clarifies the conditions under which one can be blamed in holding false beliefs: ‘belief mismanagement’ – when false moral beliefs are acquired from “recklessness or negligence in the management of one’s opinion” (2004:302). Such a mismanagement violates the ‘procedural epistemic obligations’ (PEOs): to “ask certain questions, to take careful notes, to stop and think” (2004:301). In essence, these are precautions one must make in order to ensure that they are justified in their beliefs: critical thinking, scientific testing, rationality and logic. Failing to fulfil these obligations, Rosen argues that their acts are derivatively blameworthy (if these beliefs are indeed false). This, too, remains a convincing line of argument – whilst unawareness of our actions’ moral wrongness may intuitively save us from blame, it would remain unsatisfying to extend this excuse for individuals who are careless in their beliefs. Without an account of PEOs, we would thus excuse a murderer who believed their action was morally-acceptable, merely as they “hadn’t really thought about it”.

Whilst Rosen’s conditions for culpably holding false beliefs are compelling, his application of them is more problematic when considering the 2017 Parsons Green bombing. The bombing, which was carried out at Parsons Green Underground station, was an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist attack. The bomber, Ahmed Hassan, came to the UK as an asylum seeker in 2015. Whilst not much is known about his upbringing, reports indicate that his father was killed in a coalition air raid on Baghdad during the 2003 Iraq War, and he was subsequently abducted and radicalised by Islamic State. In September 2017, Hassan detonated a home-made ‘bucket bomb’, hospitalising thirty people (2018:1).

Given his early radicalisation by Islamic State, Hassan clearly acted under the false moral belief about the virtue of causing suffering and terror in the UK. Yet, Rosen would refuse to assign blame in such a case, arising from his belief in ‘doxastic involuntarism’ – that revising our beliefs is beyond our direct control, and instead, is “a passive matter”. In this way, whilst one can take steps to influence their environment – such as the people they speak to or the books they read – the change in view itself “is something that simply happens…to me. It is not something I do” (2004:302). For Hassan, then, given his radicalisation, Rosen would likely argue that he could not be blamed for committing the attack, since he had no choice to believe anything else.

However, our moral intuitions clearly regard the removal of Hassan’s cognitive agency to this extent both worrying and unsatisfying. Firstly, Rosen’s use of doxastic involuntarism here describes a world in which individuals lack the ability to ever escape the moral beliefs of their environment – excusing any moral wrongdoing based on societal normalisation. Secondly, Rosen’s account of belief revision seems unsatisfying – if the extent of one’s control over their beliefs is to “consult [their] guru”, then where do these gurus get their moral knowledge? (2004:302). Intuitively, and to avoid an infinite regress, it seems that there must be some moral knowledge that was accessed internally or personally – that is, through a form of Cartesian reflection, or through personal observation about the world around us. In either case, it remains clear that Rosen paints an incomplete picture about our acquisition of moral knowledge – implying that, at least in some cases, doxastic involuntarism cannot hold. This is a more convincing explanation and leads us to the conclusion that Hassan at least had the capacity to choose a different moral belief, despite what his ‘gurus’ told him to believe.

This said, Rosen may rightly reply that even if Hassan could hold different moral beliefs, there is no case for blameworthiness unless he violated his PEOs. That is, Hassan can only be derivatively responsible for his act if he engaged in ‘belief mismanagement’, making him culpable for his false moral beliefs. According to Rosen, PEOs aren’t necessarily violated simply because they lead to false moral beliefs; Hassan could have been “as thoughtful and reflective and curious as a person should be”, and so remain “blameless in every procedural respect” (2004:306).

Yet, this response also seems to leave much to be desired – not least given the previous rejection of doxastic involuntarism. Given there is some level of direct control over one’s belief revision, Hassan bears more culpability for ‘getting it wrong’, and thus, the level of critical thinking and evaluation he ‘should’ have engaged in also ought to increase. William FitzPatrick (2008) extends this argument by denying that it is even possible to come to false moral beliefs if one truly honours one’s PEOs. For instance, he argues that violations of our basic PEOs can only be explained by the exercise of a vice: to be “arrogant, dismissive, lazy, dogmatic, [or] incurious” (2011:453). FitzPatrick’s response is highly compelling: in acting with utmost rationality, science, and critical thinking, it is difficult to see how one can still come to a false moral belief about an act. Indeed, in the case of the Parsons Green bombing, it remains strongly intuitive that Hassan could not possibly have come to the rational conclusion that terrorism is a morally good act, without exercising FitzPatrick’s vice in the process.

On the other hand, Harman rejects this conclusion, claiming that FitzPatrick presents a “wholly implausible picture of…moral learning”. For her, many people – after careful thought and critical thinking – come to false moral beliefs, such as ruthless business practices, which nevertheless contain elaborate and serious moral defences (2011:454). Whilst significant thought can indeed be spent on ultimately false moral beliefs, this reply risks upending the very basis of the debate; if we concede that both true and false moral beliefs are both equally rational, scientific, and defensible, we risk conceding our grounds for moral realism. Since Harman fails to provide an alternative account of what differentiates true and false moral beliefs, her argument leads us to the conclusion that one can hold false moral beliefs with as much confidence as their true counterparts – given their acquisition procedures are both equal. As such, to preserve this distinction, the denial of doxastic involuntarism clearly implies that one cannot truly honour one’s PEOs whilst holding false moral beliefs.

Upon hearing these arguments, Rosen may still resist the calls to assign moral responsibility to the Parsons Green bomber. Despite retaining the capacity to directly revise his own beliefs, and necessarily violating his PEOs, Rosen still requires an instance of Hassan’s original responsibility for blame to flow derivatively down the causal chain. As such, Rosen would likely contend the possibility that the Parsons Green bomber was not only ignorant about the falsity of his moral beliefs, but also ignorant of his violation of his PEOs. For example, we can “imagine…that he has been badly taught” – perhaps that rationality, science, or critical thinking are second-rate to feeling, religion, and moral obedience (2004:305).[1] Given this ignorance, Rosen argues that to expect one to act against what he rationally believes to be in accordance to his PEOs is illogical: “it is of course possible for a person to act contrary to his reflective judgement… But is it reasonable to demand or expect that he do so?” (2004:306).

Rosen’s concern is indeed a legitimate one – if an individual has never had the moral education to understand what his PEOs are, then it seems to be a mistake to deem him responsible for inadvertently violating them. Indeed, for Hassan, it is no great leap to believe that, during radicalisation, the importance of critical thinking and science was likely very actively discouraged, besides taught. Furthermore, without an instance of akrasia, the argument for assigning moral responsibility to an individual clearly collapses into infinite regress; Hassan is only culpable for his act if he is culpable for his false moral beliefs, he is only culpable for these beliefs if he is culpable for violating his PEOs, he is only culpable for his violation if he is culpable for some act which led him to violate, and so on. Thus, for Hassan to be culpable for his first act, we require an act for which he is non-contingently culpable – inexcusable from a claim of ignorance.

A reply is given Michelle Moody-Adams (1994). Moody-Adams explains that, in societies with privileged and oppressed classes, false moral beliefs advantaged those who benefitted from ‘moral crimes’, such as slavery. This provided many with great incentive to continue to hold such beliefs – rejecting attempts at critical thinking or evaluation. She explains that this ‘motivated ignorance’ should be treated as morally equivalent to ordinary ignorance, since both involve a form of awareness about the falsity of one’s beliefs; the awareness motivated ignorance implies is ‘indirect’, since people don’t want to see its wrongness (1994:292). This argument is deeply compelling – in many cases, it remains unsatisfying to allow people to simply choose not to attempt to find moral truths, feigning ignorance. Indeed, if one – with knowledge of their wrong – shoplifts, then it seems trivial not to judge another shoplifter – actively choosing not to think about what they are doing – equally culpable and aware.

Notably, four major insights follow from this account:

First, after rejecting doxastic involuntarism, indirect awareness implies both the capacity to hold different moral beliefs, and an awareness of this capacity. That is, in choosing to hold one moral belief, you make a judgement to not choose another, thereby rendering you indirectly aware of the possibility of other moral beliefs.

Second, if we also maintain the meaningful distinction between true and false moral beliefs, then choosing to hold false moral beliefs necessarily implies active steps to resist revising one’s beliefs. As argued, true moral beliefs are consistent with our PEOs, and simply require an open consideration of alternative moral beliefs (of which we are aware). By contrast, false beliefs necessarily require the opposite – a closed approach, actively ignoring the potential validity of alternative beliefs.

Third, it seems no great leap here to conclude that – given the imbalance in requirements for holding true and false beliefs, and the awareness of alternative beliefs – in choosing to hold false moral beliefs, one is necessarily indirectly aware that their current beliefs are false. Just as our second shoplifter – who chooses wilful ignorance about the wrongdoing of his action – is indirectly aware, so too is anyone who actively resists true moral beliefs.

Fourth, these active steps resemble FitzPatrick’s vice; since false moral beliefs are inconsistent with fulfilling one’s PEOs, then active steps to retain false moral beliefs are the active choices to violate one’s PEOs. Indeed, if one is to ‘choose not to see’ true moral beliefs, it is impossible to argue that they are demonstrating rationality, critical thinking, or a scientific approach. In much the same way, one who is aware that they hold false moral beliefs, necessarily is aware that they are violating their PEOs.

From these four major insights, I present an alternative theory of moral responsibility: ‘indirect akrasia’.[2] Returning to the Parsons Green bomber, we retain Rosen’s original-derivative responsibility distinction, and include: a rejection of doxastic involuntarism, a necessary relation between holding false moral beliefs and violating one’s PEOs, and the notion of indirect awareness. Thus, Hassan’s false moral beliefs do nothing to diminish his moral responsibility; whilst his act was indeed done under false moral beliefs, he remains derivatively responsible, since he is derivatively responsible for holding these beliefs and is originally responsible for his belief mismanagement.

Contra Rosen, we can establish this original responsibility on account of Hassan’s necessary aware violation of his PEOs. Even if he was never informed of his PEOs, the Parsons Green bomber must still have been indirectly aware that he was violating them; indirectly aware that he was holding false moral beliefs, Hassan was also indirectly aware that he was violating his PEOs. Even if Rosen attempts to launch further arguments here – such as that Hassan was taught moral truth was moral falsity, and vice versa – he cannot escape the conclusion that Hassan’s wilful ignorance does nothing to exculpate his active lack of awareness. In this way, Hassan’s ‘indirect akrasia’ in mismanaging his beliefs renders him morally responsible for his attack.

In conclusion, whilst Rosen’s distinction between derivative and original responsibility remains convincing, the rest of his theory of moral responsibility fails to provide a satisfying or intuitive account. Specifically, his inclusion of doxastic involuntarism and limitation of PEOs, render his exculpation of moral responsibility in intuitive cases uncompelling – demonstrated clearly in the 2017 Parsons Green bomber.

By contrast, my alternative theory of ‘indirect akrasia’ more convincingly accounts for our moral intuitions about culpability in such cases – namely, that despite radicalisation, Hassan bears moral responsibility for both his terror attack and his false moral beliefs. In rejecting doxastic involuntarism and expanding the scope of our PEOs, this approach more convincingly allows individuals to be held culpable for their moral beliefs – whilst recognising moral truth and the requirement for awareness in assigning moral responsibility.

[1] It is important to note that – whilst presented as the opposites of our procedural epistemic obligations – none of feelings, religion, or moral obedience are necessarily incompatible. Indeed, many philosophical traditions, such as Ethics of Care, provide a more nuanced account of how these principles can be combined with our procedural epistemic obligations. Instead, for a concise analysis, the argument driven here is that to be unaware of these obligations is to be taught to exclusively utilise their opposites.

[2] Please note that my final theory of ‘indirect akrasia’ was coined independently, to differentiate it from the arguments it borrows from. Whilst in form it mirrors much of Moody-Adams’s motivated ignorance, she notably doesn’t take procedural epistemic obligations to be violated necessarily. Likewise, whilst its assertion of a necessary relation between violating such obligations and holding false moral beliefs mirrors FitzPatrick’s argument, he does not take such a violation to be a case of akrasia.

Bibliography:

• Cobain, I. (2018), “Parsons Green tube bomber Ahmed Hassan jailed for life”. The Guardian (online): https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/23/parsons-green-tube-bomber-ahmed-hassan-jailed-for-life . Date accessed: 07/06/2024.
• FitzPatrick, W. (2008), “Moral Responsibility and Normative Ignorance: Answering a New Skeptical Challenge”. Ethics, Vol. 118, pp. 589-613.
• Harman, E. (2011), “Does Moral Ignorance Exculpate?”. Ratio, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 443-468.
• Moody-Adams, M. (1994), “Culture, Responsibility, and Affected Ignorance”. Ethics, Vol. 104, pp. 291-309.
• Rosen, G. (2004), “Skepticism about Moral Responsibility”. Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 18, pp. 295-313.