Who bears the costs of climate change?

The question of which states should bear the burdens of tackling climate change, and by how much, is hotly contested. The Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP) proposes that costs be shared among states who benefit from the activities that cause climate change. By contrast, the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) proposes an allocation of burdens according to who committed these activities – regardless of benefit or loss. Drawing on Henry Shue, I argue that there are no compelling reasons to adopt the BPP over the PPP for burden-sharing. The PPP remains as convincing as the BPP in its duty-creation mechanism for both polluters and the descendants of polluters. Moreover, the BPP’s duty-creation mechanism for polluters is counter-intuitive and self-violating, rendering the PPP overall more convincing than the BPP.

Note, ‘pollution’ is taken as synonymous to any activity which causes climate change. Likewise, ‘burden-identification’ is not discussed; instead, they are taken as parts of a fixed ‘debt’, which must be fully-paid (2012:302). For a more convincing comparative analysis, only arguments which are framed in moral individualism are presented. Whilst Shue’s (1999) ‘collective responsibility’ argument is important, key BPP thinkers, like Axel Gosseries (2004), explicitly “want to resist” this move – so this essay restricts arguments to a common framework (2004:42).

To demonstrate that the BPP should not be adopted for burden-sharing, it is sufficient to only show that it is less compelling than at least one other principle – here, the PPP. As such, the foundational duty-creation mechanisms for polluters, of both principles, are evaluated. Having established the firmer intuition behind the PPP, we critically evaluate the claims by Gosseries (2004) and Edward A. Page (2012) that the BPP is exclusively capable of allocating burdens of ancestral pollution.

1. Remedial duties of polluters:

As Page (2012) explains, the PPP proposes that the burdens of tackling climate change should be distributed to states, “according to their respective shares of the accumulations of greenhouse gas” (2012:304). These accumulations, according to Shue (2021), are portions of a global ‘carbon budget’. Importantly, “much of the budget has been spent” – mostly because of previous industrialisations by now-developed nations (2021:29). The PPP identifies this over-spending as a moral wrong – an unjust harm which creates a duty to compensate the victims. As Shue explains, this harm occurs when the negative effects of burning fossil fuels are ‘externalised’ (not bore by the polluter) at the international level – a process called ‘sovereign externalisation’. These negative effects include the violation of human rights, including the right to physical security, as climate change brings more frequent and severe floods, wildfires, and disease vectors (e.g. mosquitos and ticks). It also includes the imposed economic costs of adapting to these risks (2021:47).

This approach has immense intuitive appeal; as Simon Caney (2006) recognises, “if I release some toxic waste in a river then surely…I should pay” (2006:427). Indeed, it is difficult to see how one could argue that the perpetrator of a moral wrong should not be held responsible for recompensating the victims. As the wrongness of pollution is so clear, ceteris paribus, it seems undeniable that a state’s wrongful imposition of harm is their responsibility to remedy.

However, the BPP provides an alternative – distributing burdens only to states who “derived economic benefits from [pollution]”. This derivation of benefit – or ‘wrongful enrichment’ – may come “from activities within or beyond [states’] borders”, so remedial duties are not limited, like the PPP, to only the polluters. Additionally, states’ burdens are distributed proportionate to the immoral benefit derived, rather than the harm caused internationally. At the core of this principle, then, is the assertion that “profiting from environmental [damage]” creates the duty to compensate – instead of simply perpetrating damage (2012:306). Furthermore, as Daniel Butt (2009) explains, this derives from the general obligation of all moral agents: to “not to benefit from the suffering of others” (2009:127).

This mechanism is initially compelling; in the case of war profiteering, enrichment is clearly more objectionable than simply waging war. Likewise, it seems reasonable that the derivation of benefit could create duties to both those waging war for profit, and those profiting from a war they are not involved in.

However, whilst wrongful enrichment retains theoretical agreeability, its applicability to our case is less than clear. For example, most historic and current pollution arose from industrialisation – in which the ‘benefit’ is economic growth, improvements in living standards, and reduction in overall poverty (2021:32). In this way, it is reasonable to see the derivation of benefit as a moral good – unlike war profiteering, where the profit is a moral bad. As such, industrialisation is less analogous to war profiteering, and more to the ballads of Robin Hood. Hood’s gift to the poor after ‘stealing from the rich’, as Jeppe von Platz (2016) notes, is an example of generating a morally-good benefit from the initial wrong of theft.[1] Without giving a judgement on the overall morality of Robin Hood’s act, it is sufficient to simply conclude that Robin Hood does not commit an act more wrongful than a thief who does not give to the poor. As such, it appears untenable to argue that Robin Hood should have any more obligations than the second thief – instead, we should attribute the same or fewer. Yet, the BPP proposes that industrialising states owe an additional remedial duty compared to states who pollute without any good economic benefit.

Without providing additional criteria, it seems counter-intuitive for the BPP to only assign remedial duties to states who used pollution to raise living standards, whilst absolving ‘wasteful polluters’ who produced no economic benefit. For Paul Baer (2006), that “some countries with high…emissions have remained (or become) relatively poor”, whilst others have become wealthy with relatively low emissions, demonstrates how states’ derivation of benefit (given pollution) is morally better (2006:253). Comparing the pollution and benefit of China and Nigeria, this argument crystalises. According to the World Bank (2022), over the past 40 years, China’s intense industrial strategy – particularly in coal and steel – lifted 770 million people out of poverty. Here, pollution was efficiently used to maximise benefit. By contrast, as Urhie et al (2020) note, Nigeria is one of the largest global polluters, yet remains underdeveloped – marred by corruption and misuse of resources, particularly along the Niger Delta. Whilst pollution is undoubtable, benefit is less clear.

This is clearly persuasive; it is counterintuitive to suggest that China commits a worse wrong – evidenced by their greater remedial duty – by bringing millions out of poverty whilst polluting. Even worse, it feels morally outrageous to suggest that Nigeria should have no remedial duty to the international climate system for their contribution to the carbon debt. If the BPP’s logic was applied universally, states could commit any environmental crime, providing no clear overall benefit could be established; thus, it is unclear how the BPP would assign remedial duties to the state after the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster (2006:258).

This issue with the BPP’s mechanism for polluters is further compounded by Caney (2006), whose argument of deceased beneficiaries can be adapted to ‘wasteful polluters’. Following Caney’s logic, if 10 equally- (and independently-) benefitting states collectively pollute a debt of x units, then each has a remedial duty equal to their benefit of x/10 units. If instead 5 gained no benefit from their share of pollution, however, then – as the full debt must be repaid – the benefitting polluters would each owe x/5 units, despite each only benefitting x/10 units. Thus, despite claiming to distribute burdens only according to each states’ benefit, the BPP concludes that benefitting polluters must “pick up the bill for everyone” – a requirement which is “unfair for the aim of the [BPP]” (2006:473).

This argument is convincing; however self-violating, distributing solely according to benefit clearly leads to beneficiaries being burdened by more than their benefit. China would thus have to pay for the clean-up of Nigeria’s wasteful pollution – despite neither benefitting from, nor perpetrating, it. This is a type of ‘self-effacing’ issue, which – as Austin Keefe (2021) argues – may only ensure states only pay for their benefit by adopting a principle closer to the PPP. This self-violating issue – combined with the additional duties for beneficiaries – renders the BPP’s duty-creation mechanism for polluters less convincing than the PPP’s.

2. Allocating the burdens of ancestral pollution:

Whilst the BPP’s mechanism for polluters remains less convincing than the PPP’s, we may still adopt the former for burden-sharing. According to Page (2012), this is because the BPP exclusively manages to “finesse…problems associated with holding present states morally responsible for the…behaviour of ancestral political units” (2012:307). If this is indeed the case – and given that most of the carbon debt is ancestral pollution – then the BPP would overall be the most compelling (2021:29).

First, then, Gosseries (2004) proposes a BPP mechanism for duty-creation of beneficiaries of ancestral pollution – ‘transgenerational free-riding’. For duty-creation, given the sole requirement of benefit, the BPP only requires current generations to be ‘free-riders’: someone who “obtains a benefit without paying…its cost” (2004:46). Unlike ‘parasitism’, free-riding neither imposes costs on others, nor requires action beyond accepting situational benefits. According to Gosseries, then, just as states may free-ride the economic development of emerging economies, so too may they free-ride the pollution of previous generations.

Gosseries’ case is intuitive; whilst ‘wrongful enrichment’ only had bite where it worsened the moral status of the act, transgenerational free-riding here simply proposes that beneficiaries of others’ pollution should pay the same cost as non-free-riders. Whilst not imposing any undue costs themselves, free-riders indeed “exploit their privileged position to obtain economic benefits” at prices below what non-free-riding, developing states can access (2012:314). By only appealing to a basic moral principle of fairness, Gosseries’ case rests on firm philosophical ground.

However, Robert Nozick (1974) questions if passive acceptance can confer such strong duties. As “a free-rider harms no one”, the acceptance of benefit is victimless. Given that they are “incapable of excluding themselves” from benefits “imposed on [them]”, free-riders’ inaction can be taken as morally-neutral (1974:93). In fact, for Nozick, in many cases, “not enjoying [the benefits] may have required him to act” (2004:47).

Whilst providing initial appeal, Nozick’s critique lacks depth; in particular, it remains uncompelling to argue that passive action is inherently morally-neutral, and presumptively preferred over ‘active’ action. By Nozick’s logic, a father (‘actively’ harming no one) may be justified in watching his child run into oncoming traffic, as saving his son would ‘require him to act’. In the same way, it is hard to see how beneficiaries of ancestral pollution can absolve their acceptance of wrongful advantage.

Furthermore, Gosseries counters that, whilst benefits may be ‘imposed’ on free-riders, the passive acceptance of wrongful benefits implies a tacit acceptance of their “associated obligations”. These obligations may be performed by refusing any products of gained benefit. For instance, for a beneficiary of rising CO₂ emissions – whilst unable to “prevent foreign CO₂ particles” entering their territory – they can limit production in sectors which receive a productivity boost (2004:48).

Whilst Gosseries convincingly refutes Nozick’s critique, Geert Demuijnck (2004) argues that his determination of wrongdoing remains problematic; in particular, proposing recompensation for transgenerational free-riding “assumes that the initial distribution of goods was morally acceptable”. Without “[presupposing] legitimate property rights”, Gosseries is unable to show moral wrongdoing. Instead, Demuijnck argues that all historical property claims are the messy products of wrongful violence (2004:62).

This is a compelling critique; Gosseries indeed provides us no basis to assume that starting relations are themselves morally right. For instance, it would seem mistaken to treat colonial and colonised nations identically – simply because both free-ride into a wrong ‘advantage’. As such, without knowing the moral status of the starting positions, it is impossible to determine whether a beneficiary ought to recompensate for their wrong advantage – or be allowed, as compensation for the wrong disadvantage of their starting situation.

Recognising the utility of Gosseries’ and Demuijnck’s arguments, Page synthesises the essential points of both. Like Demuijnck, Page rejects the assumption of wrongdoing. Instead, he argues that beneficiaries of ancestral pollution are guilty of ‘unjust enrichment’; “even if no wrongdoing can be identified in their…intergenerational transfer”, these free-riders have a duty to “restore justice…by ‘giving up’, rather than ‘paying back’” (2012:314). Page maintains this duty principally because “the disadvantages and benefits share common origins”. Wrongdoing, therefore, only occurs wherein states refuse to honour their remedial duty (2012:313).

Page’s ‘unjust enrichment’ argument is highly compelling. In abandoning the requirement of wrongdoing for duty-creation, Page convincingly argues for a general obligation to fairness; whilst it may not be morally wrong to ‘cheat’, you still have a duty to give up your ill-gotten gains, because it is unfair to the rest of the players. This duty to fairness is intuitive and allows Page to propose compensation “to achieve a future state of justice” – unlike Gosseries, who proposes restoring morally-ambiguous relations “had climate change not occurred” (2012:314).

Nonetheless, whilst the BPP holds current beneficiaries of ancestral pollution accountable, it is insufficient to adopt it if the PPP is equally capable. Shue (2021) explains that the PPP’s core issue with free-riders is that because it allocates burdens according to who polluted, if the collection of individuals in a current state are not the same as their polluting ancestors, then it is not clear how they can be held responsible. If they were allocated these burdens, then “individuals in the present…[would] suffer for ‘crimes’ they did not themselves commit” (2021:34).

However, Shue (1999) maintains that holding the descendants of polluters responsible is the fairest option possible. Here, Shue differentiates between culpability and responsibility; current states are not culpable for the pollution of their ancestors – as the sins of the father are not the son’s – but they are still responsible for it. In the example of knocking over a friend’s vase accidentally, Shue argues that it would be outrageous to argue that “I broke it, but I want you to clean it up” (1999:535). Given that someone must pay for the debt incurred, Shue argues that it is impossible to find a fairer agent to pay than the son.

Shue’s argument is convincing; given that the burdens must be paid by someone, it is clearly insufficient to simply state who is not responsible, but to make a case for who is most responsible. Furthermore, whilst current states could not reasonably be blamed for their forefathers’ acts, it is still compelling to question “who is going to pay” (2021:38). Demuijnck echoes this, arguing that culpability is indeed irrelevant – if someone found a painting stolen by their grandfather in their house, it would nonetheless be their responsibility to “give it back” (2004:62). In this way, allocating burdens to those most responsible – in an imperfect, but fairest possible, way – is clearly not a violation of the PPP; in fact, to allocate these burdens instead to states who were not descendants – and thus less responsible – would undoubtedly be certain violation of the PPP. Thus, the PPP is able to convincingly hold beneficiaries of ancestral pollution accountable, without distributing according to benefit.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, considering how the burdens of tackling climate change should be shared among states, it is clear that there is no reason to accept the Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP) over the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP). Moreover, considering that both principles can allocate ancestral pollution, the BPP’s counter-intuitive and apparently self-violating mechanism for polluters means there is more reason to accept the PPP over the BPP.

Note, however, that the greater intuition and convincingness of the PPP over the BPP here does not suggest that the former should be the principle of allocation. For simplicity, I have restricted myself only to two main principles, yet the Ability to Pay Principle (APP) – from Caney (2010) and others – may provide a more convincing and nuanced rule for allocating burdens. Likewise, only arguments from moral individualism have been considered; Shue (1999) provides alternative arguments for ancestral pollution using ‘collective responsibility’, and these may complexify the final distributive principle.

As such, whilst this argument can be expanded, it is sufficient simply to demonstrate that the PPP is more convincing than the BPP, to reject the latter as the chosen distributive principle.

Footnotes:

[1] Whilst it is possible to deny that Robin Hood even did wrong in stealing – i.e. by critiquing the taxation imposed – these side-step the principle demonstrated. With Platz, then, I assume a moral wrong by the explicit reference to ‘stealing’, rather than ‘redistributing’, from the rich.

References:

• Baer, P. (2006), “Adaptation to Climate Change: Who Pays Whom?” in “Climate Ethics: Essential Readings”, edited by Stephen M. Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale Jamieson, and Henry Shue. Oxford University Press, 2010.
• Butt, D. (2009), “Rectifying International Injustice: Principles of Compensation and Restitution Between Nations”. Oxford University Press, 2009.
• Caney, S. (2006), “Environmental Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Significance of History”. Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 464-482.
• –––. (2010), “Climate change and the duties of the advantaged”. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 203-228.
• Demuijnck, G. (2004), “Environmental Free-Riding and the Limited Scope of Interactive Justice: A Comment on Axel Gosseries”. Ethical Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 61-71.
• Gosseries, A. (2004), “Historical Emissions and Free-Riding”. Ethical Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 36-60.
• Keefe, A. (2021), “What Is Wrong With Self-effacing Ethical Theories?”. Georgia State University, 2021.
• Nozick, R. (1974), “Anarchy, State, and Utopia”. Blackwell, 1974.
• Page, E.A. (2012), “Give It up for Climate Change: A Defence of the Beneficiary Pays Principle”. International Theory, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 300-330.
• Platz. J.V. (2016), “Robin Hood Justice: Why Robin Hood Took From The Rich And Gave To The Poor (And We Should Too)”. Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 149-169.
• Shue, H. (1999), “Global Environment and International Inequality”. International Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 3, pp. 531-545.
• –––. (2021), “The pivotal generation: Why we have a moral responsibility to slow climate change right now”. Princeton University Press, 2021.
• Urhie et al (2020), “Economic growth, air pollution and health outcomes in Nigeria: A moderated mediation model”. Cogent Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 1-14.
• World Bank (2022), “Lifting 800 Million People Out of Poverty – New Report Looks at Lessons from China’s Experience”. World Bank Group: www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/04/01/lifting-800-million-people-out-of-poverty-new-report-looks-at-lessons-from-china-s-experience . Date accessed: 21/08/2024.